Wednesday, December 29, 2010

In Defense of the Doberman (and other dogs banned by the Army)

File:Monument to Doberman, Military Working Dog (MWD), World War II Memorial, War Dog Cemetery. Navel Base Guam.jpg
In a quiet corner of Naval Base Guam, a Doberman Pinscher named “Kurt” sits quiet but alert atop the World War II War Dog Memorial. In reality, Kurt is a bronze statue. Kurt, along with 24 other Dobermans whose names are inscribed on the memorial, died fighting with the US Marine Corps against Japanese forces on Guam in 1944. Kurt was the first dog killed when he was mortally wounded by a Japanese grenade. These dogs served as scouts, sentries, messengers, and even retrieved wounded Marines on the battlefield not only on Guam, but on numerous battlefields in World War II, Korea, and Viet Nam. Countless Soldiers and Marines have been saved by these and other war dogs.

Fast forward to today.  In spite of the proud history of this breed, Dobermans are not allowed in Army family housing according to Department of the Army (DA) policy. The 2009 policy explicitly bans certain dog breeds, including Dobermans, despite evidence that breed bans do not make communities safer. This is a tragedy that DA should rectify immediately. The current policy is not only unfair to responsible dog owners, but more importantly, is unlikely to be effective.  As a dog owner, I am concerned that this policy unfairly targets specific breeds.  As an Army leader, I am concerned that this is a poor policy which fails to protect our Soldiers and Families.

Breed bans simply do not make communities safer from dangerous dogs because it is impossible to determine which dogs are dangerous based on breed alone. According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), “There is currently no accurate way to identify the number of dogs of a particular breed, and consequently no measure to determine which breeds are more likely to bite or kill.”  The American Veterinary Medical Association (AMVA) concurs with the CDC stating, “Breed-specific ordinances imply that there is an objective method of determining the breed of a particular dog, when in fact, there is not at this time.”  As a result, policy makers often resort to sensationalized media stereotypes and popular culture myths to decide which breeds to ban.

The current DA policy bans dogs which are stereotypically portrayed in the media as aggressive, or as “attack” dogs. Simultaneously, the DA policy omits breeds which should be of equal or greater concern. In fact, of the nine purebred dog breeds most often involved in fatal attacks, the DA policy only bans four.  The DA policy omits the German Shepherd Dog, Husky, Malamute, Great Dane, and Saint Bernard, all of which are large, strong and potentially dangerous dogs, and all of which appear in a CDC report on dog bite fatalities.  These dogs typically escape breed bans because they do not have sensational reputations, nor do they look like “attack” dogs. The DA policy also omits lesser-known but potentially dangerous dogs, such as Bull Mastiffs and Presa Canarios.

The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) asserts that breed-specific bans may actually diminish rather than enhance public safety. This occurs for two reasons. First, individuals who seek aggressive dogs turn to breeds which are not banned. Communities which enact breed bans often see dog bites increase from other, legal breeds. Second, breed bans may induce a false sense of security, leading communities to overlook more effective, breed-neutral “dangerous dog” policies. As evidence, the ASPCA cites studies in which dog bites remained high or went up in communities which enacted breed-specific bans, while breed-neutral policies were effective in reducing dog bites.

Another shortcoming of breed bans is that they focus exclusively on heredity to determine the potential danger of a dog. In reality, heredity plays a relatively minor role in dog aggression. According to the AMVA, there are multiple factors which influence a dog’s aggressiveness, including early experience, socialization, training, and health.  Additionally, reproductive status plays a large role in dog aggressiveness. According to the ASPCA (as cited from research), unneutered male dogs are responsible for an estimated 70 to 76 percent of reported dog bites, and are 2.6 times more likely to bite than neutered dogs. Unspayed females attract potentially dangerous roaming males.

The empirical evidence all points to a conclusion that responsible dog owners have known for many years: the problem is at the other end of the leash. All communities, the Army included, would be better off targeting bad dog owners than bad dogs. The truth is that any large breed of dog can become a dangerous dog in the hands of a bad owner. Accordingly, the Army should replace its flawed policy with the following guidelines, which are based on guidelines from the CDC and other organizations:

1. Enact a breed-neutral dangerous dog policy based on the “Model legislation for the identification and regulation of ‘dangerous’ dogs” found in Appendix 4 of the American Veterinary Medical Association’s report “A community approach to dog bite prevention.” (http://www.avma.org/public_health/dogbite/dogbite.pdf) All dogs should be considered potentially dangerous, and each dog should be judged according to its behavior rather than breed.

2. Enact mandatory behavioral evaluations of certain breeds by a veterinarian or other animal behavior specialist. While wholesale breed bans are ineffective, it is common sense to pay special attention to certain animals. Dog with a combination of size, strength and temperament that would pose a high risk of catastrophic injury to humans in the event of an attack should be screened for aggressive behavior prior to being allowed in Army housing. The list of breeds should be put together with the help of knowledgeable experts to ensure that breeds are selected based on science rather than stereotypes.

3. Enact a strict neuter/spay policy. A strict spay/neuter policy would not only make Army communities safer, but would decrease the population of unwanted and potentially dangerous dogs.

4. Enact strict and immediate penalties for owners with dangerous dogs. Penalties for violating any of the above policies should be swift and severe, up to and including action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Breed bans are not the answer to aggressive dog problems.  The answer is to address poor dog owners directly by strictly monitoring and enforcing breed-neutral dangerous dog policies.  Hopefully, the Army will update its pet policy to a more reasonable and effective one.

Sources:

Special Report, “Breeds of dogs involved in fatal human attacks in the United States between 1979 and 1998”, http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/images/dogbreeds-a.pdf

ASPCA Position Statement on Breed-Specific Legislation, http://www.aspca.org/about-us/policy-positions/breed-specific-legislation-1.aspx

CDC Dog Bite Fact Sheet, http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/dog-bites/dogbite-factsheet.html

“A community approach to dog bite prevention”, American Veterinary Medical Association, Task Force on Canine Aggression and Human-Canine Interactions, http://www.avma.org/public_health/dogbite/dogbite.pdf

Sunday, December 19, 2010

Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repealed

As I predicted in my previous post on DADT, the law has been repealed by the US Congress.  Curiously, there is a story that Lady GaGa was personally informed via twitter by Sen. Majority Leader Harry Reid.  Another demonstration of how twisted our celebrity-obsessed culture really is.  What in the world does Lady GaGa, a “singer” and notoriously bad dresser, have to do with legislation related to the US military?   So she “tweeted” to her minions to repeal DADT…so?  Why should we care what she thinks?  Is she going to sign up?  I doubt it.

Although, her “meat dress” my have an interesting influence on military dress uniform fashion….

Friday, December 17, 2010

Afghanistan Strategic Review: “We Are Making Progress”…..toward?

The strategic review of the Afghanistan war is in.  This time around the review attracted considerably fewer protests than the strategic review of the Iraq surge.  I could be coy and feign ignorance, or I could simply state the truth that many of those who protested GEN Petraeus at the Iraq review did so because they hated President George W. Bush.  Now that they have a President they like, they are far less inclined to protest.  In short, they are blazing hypocrites.  However, I digress.

A summary of the review can be found at the New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/opinion/17fri1.html?src=twrhp.  Anderson Cooper also had a segment on the review last night, which featured a montage of President Obama’s remarks on Afghanistan:

[cnnvideo url='http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2010/12/17/ac.afghan.reality.check.cnn' inline='true']

As usual, the politicians and pundits alike are focusing on whether we are winning or not.  The larger and more important question is whether we need to win at all.  Going back to my previous post, it doesn’t do you a whole lot of good to “win” when you are bidding $5.50 for a one dollar bill.

In the President’s defense, he did address this question in his December 2009 speech at West Point where he announced the 30,000 troop surge.  “As Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.”  I’m heartened by the fact that he is using the proper test for not only escalating, but continuing the Afghanistan war at all.  What is less clear is if he was or is correct about our vital national interests in Afghanistan.  I’ve yet to hear this argument clearly articulated.  There is a direct relationship between our national interests and desired strategic end state, which also explains why officials have difficulty articulating end state as well.

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Afghanistan: “A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation”???

Recently, Army Colonel Robert M. Cassidy published an article on Small Wars Journal entitled A Precis on the Logic of the Afghan War.  Below is my response to the article, which can also be found in the comments section on SWJ.  Check out the Wikipedia entry for the Dollar Auction Game for more info.

_______________________

There is a game called "The Dollar Auction." The rules are simple. The auctioneer puts $1 up for auction, beginning at 1 cent. He will sell to the highest bidder. The catch is that the second highest bidder must also pay his bid - and he doesn't get anything.

Generally, the game proceeds along, and eventually someone bids $1, leaving someone else with a bid of 95 cents or something similar. Then the fun part starts. The second-highest bidder has an incentive to bid $1.01 because he will only be out 1 cent instead of 95 cents. The original bidder of $1 then has the same incentive to bid, say, $1.10.

The bids continue well beyond $1. Eventually, the game becomes more about winning than profit. Dollar bills have gone for $3-$5 dollars, and sometimes $20. The bidding often becomes heated and emotional.

We've been in Afghanistan a while now. COL Cassidy sounds like he is bidding $3 for a $1 bill rather than articulating a viable way ahead for Afghanistan.

A comprehensive COIN strategy in Afghanistan with the aim of transforming that country into a working, non-terrorist democracy is certainly the best outcome we could want. Given enough time, money, and blood, we might be able to achieve it.

The problem is that this strategy will take so long and be so expensive that it won't be worth the effort. Sure, we'll end up with a buck, but how much will we have paid for it?

A limited counter-terrorism strategy is certainly not capable of producing the same results as a COIN strategy. However, it is much more efficient. While we may get, say, 75% of the effectiveness, we get it at 10% of the cost. We get more bang for the buck.

The 800lb gorilla in the room is the defense budget. It will shrink, and soon. While COIN is the most effective strategy, it is also the most manpower intensive, ergo, the most expensive. COL Cassidy does not mention this fact.

It is time we opted for a more efficient strategy. While not as effective, a limited counter-terrorism strategy is more sustainable in the long run.

Thursday, December 2, 2010

Ask Me…I’ll Tell

The study on Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) is finally in, and the consensus seems to be that openly gay service in the military is not going to be a major disruption.  Although this issue is only tangendentally related to strategy, I thought that my dedicated readership (all 15 of you) might like a comment or two on the issue given that this blog has a heavy military focus.

First, the study.  I can’t say I am surprised at the results.  Today’s service members grew up in a society where homosexuality is much less of a stigma than in previous generations.  They are comfortable with homosexuals, and therefore will be comfortable serving with them.  Additionally, there are a significant number of homosexual service members serving today.  Though there are not many, there are enough that the average service member has served with a homosexual at least once in his/her career.  This is certainly the case for me.  I’ve found that the few homosexuals that are in the service are more interested in serving their country than they are making political or social statements.

That last part is important.  Do not confuse those homosexuals who desire to serve with their counterparts who are advocating for the repeal of DADT.  While the former simply want to serve, the latter do not.  Though their ends are the same, their reasons are different.  Many of the DADT repeal advocates have zero interest in serving, or the readiness of the armed forces.  For them, this is a political football.  Still, the questionable motivations of some should not sway us from the facts, which are that homosexuals can serve openly, it would appear, with little or no negative impacts on readiness.

Finally, we should be realistic about how many homosexuals really desire to serve.  Military service men and women predominately come from conservative middle American, aka “flyover country.”  In contrast, most homosexuals identify themselves as liberals and live on the coasts.  This makes it unlikely that homosexuals (as coastal liberals) with begin joining in droves.  We might see a few join at the outset as a political statement, however, these individuals will quickly learn that being in the military can really, really suck at times, particularly during basic training.  Probably not worth it to prove a point that by then will have already been proven.

I think most homosexuals who want to serve are probably already serving.  While DADT is castigated on both the left and the right, in the end it has probably been a pretty good policy.  It has allowed the military a transition period to gradually integrate homosexuals into the ranks in a measured fashion.  It has allowed service members to serve next to homosexuals and figure out that it isn’t really that scary.

The final thing to address is the morality issue.  Some will claim that serving with homosexuals violates their moral values.  That is fine, and they can always vote with their feet.  However, I find this argument dubious at best.  Go outside any military installation, and Army installations in particular, and you are likely to see a myriad of seedy strip bars and sex shops.  The fact is that some military service members routinely engage in behavior which is contrary to the moral values of most Christian and other religions in some form or fashion.  If someone refuses to serve with anyone who violates the 10 commandments, then US military service certainly isn’t for them.

What is next?  This will be a political fight, but armed with the DoD study results, Republicans in Congress will have little to stand on in opposing DADT.  They are making a stink about it now, but will probably use it as a bargaining chip to gain concessions from the Democrats.